Yesterday, I posted a brief
"http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/02/22/al-qaeda-iraq-syria/">
piece for the
Foreign Policy Association
regarding the precipitous drop in violence localized in Iraq's
Nineveh province. This decline in hostilities is notable for one
very important reason: Nineveh has served as the informal
headquarters for al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) since the insurgency moved
to Mosul and Tal Afar following the Battle of Fallujah in
2004.
Since that time, the region has experienced some of the
worst, and most chronic, bloodshed in the country -- daily car
bombs and IED explosions have proved a fact of life on terror's
home turf.
Yet now, while the rest of the country is enduring a steep
uptick in violence since the end of the U.S. counterinsurgency,
Nineveh is enjoying a relative calm. Certainly, this represents a
breather for the Maliki government, which has been staggered by
political fragility and sectarian violence reminiscent of pre-surge
Iraq. So this is good news, right?
Not really. Reports suggest that this comparative serenity
is more likely indicative of AQI's physical relocation, as opposed
to an indicator of combat fatigue or tactical
adjustment.
So where are they off to? Well, at the moment, Syria
sounds like a pretty popular destination for battle-hardened,
Kalashnikov-toting zealots taking their cues from al Qaeda's
braintrust.
Lest we forget -- last week, Osama bin Laden's right hand
man and presumptive successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, released a
"http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17002573">video
imploring Muslim radicals in neighboring countries to join the
growing uprising against Syria's Assad government. AQI was
sponsoring violence before this summons, but formal marching orders
have prompted a dramatic increase in the number of fighters
crossing the border into the embattled neighbor-state.
With al Qaeda set to play an expanded role in the Syrian
drama, it's worth considering where they fit in this increasingly
bewildering regional conflagration. As it happens, they're simply
the latest exogenous actor competing against (or alongside) a host
of contenders including (but not limited to) our NATO ally Turkey,
the Iranian menace and the region's leading Sunni power and oil
spigot, Saudi Arabia.
Not to be outdone, Senator McCain has
"http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57381422/sen-mccain-its-time-to-arm-syrias-rebels/">
suggested it's high time we arm the
rebels:
I'm not calling for an invasion of Syria, but I am calling
for practical measure which can be of assistance to them, which
would break this stalemate, which would allow the Syrian people to
achieve the aspiration that we hold for all people.
Noble sentiments indeed and I appreciate the senator's
fondness for a fair fight. Rebels in the city of Homs -- epicenter
of Syrian uprising, past and present -- are increasingly concerned
by the mass of tanks and troops outside of their hometown. They're
outmanned and outgunned, and international observers fear a
massacre. Arming these civilians would give them a fighting chance
to dislodge the 40-year-old Assad regime, and simultaneously serve
America's short-term interests. The end of Allawite tyranny would
rob Iran of its primary client state, and disrupt the flow of
monies and munitions into Lebanon and Gaza.
However, I question the logic of inserting ourselves into
a civil war on behalf of some
seriously dubious partners
through the provision of arms and ordnance. If we decide to equip
the rebellion, we will escalate conflict, amplify
violence and spark untold and unintended regional
consequences.
Not to mention, in our haste to "
"http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/01/wrong-assumptions-on-syria">oust
a brutal dictator and puppet of Iran" it appears we'll
undoubtedly arm opposition forces that have been busy killing
American soldiers in Iraq for the past decade.
That strikes me as an unpleasant proposal.
